16 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |