15 ideas
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |