159 ideas
21979 | Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel] |
22766 | Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel] |
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
22768 | Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
22772 | Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
22780 | It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
22770 | A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
22788 | A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel] |
22792 | Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel] |
21780 | A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
22769 | The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel] |
21787 | Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21786 | Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
22784 | Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel] |
8029 | You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
22771 | Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel] |
22051 | The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie] |
22781 | The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel] |
22779 | The good is realised freedom [Hegel] |
22787 | The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel] |
22790 | We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel] |
22767 | I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel] |
22789 | Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel] |
22791 | The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel] |
22778 | Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel] |
22794 | A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel] |
22799 | The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel] |
22801 | The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel] |
22796 | A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel] |
22777 | Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel] |
21791 | Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel] |
22795 | People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel] |
21988 | In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer] |
22800 | Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel] |
21792 | The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22797 | In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel] |
21790 | Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
8030 | For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
22785 | Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel] |
21789 | Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel] |
22776 | Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel] |
21778 | True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21779 | People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel] |
22085 | Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22798 | Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel] |
22783 | Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel] |
21782 | Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel] |
22773 | Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel] |
22774 | A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel] |
22775 | The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel] |
22802 | Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel] |
22786 | Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
22782 | To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel] |
22793 | Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel] |