Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Logic and Conversation' and 'Db (ideas)'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
4686 Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
7415 Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
7414 What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
6696 The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4687 Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6516 Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
24054 Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13856 Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
8948 The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3875 If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876 If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3488 Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5689 Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7734 Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
7735 Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950 Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22344 Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
3877 Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
6126 Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
3873 An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
3874 How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]