Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Explanation and Reference' and 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]