Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Truth Rehabilitated'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3488 Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5689 Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950 Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22344 Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]