23 ideas
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |