12 ideas
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |