30 ideas
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
| 9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
| 5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
| 23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
| 9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
| 9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
| 10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
| 10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
| 22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |