Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Limits of Abstraction' and 'In Defense of Essentialism'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
10143 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]
9143 Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
10145 Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K]
10136 Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K]
10144 Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3488 Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5689 Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950 Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9144 Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10141 Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10135 We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K]
9142 Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
10137 Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K]
10138 An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22344 Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]