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All the ideas for 'works', 'The Limits of Abstraction' and 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
10143 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]
9143 Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10794 The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
10786 Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
10788 Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10799 Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10790 Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
10791 Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
10787 Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
10145 Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K]
10136 Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K]
10144 Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
10789 Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796 If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797 Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3488 Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5689 Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950 Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9144 Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10141 Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10135 We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K]
9142 Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
10137 Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K]
10138 An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22344 Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]