21 ideas
12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |