Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' and 'Supervenience'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]