Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Action' and 'Beauty: a very short introduction'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
18543 Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18542 Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
3488 Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5689 Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950 Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
18546 The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
18550 Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
18544 Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
18553 Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
18556 Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
18548 Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
18551 Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22344 Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18541 Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
18554 Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]