21 ideas
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |