Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics of Ambiguity', 'Understanding and Essence' and 'Aboutness'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18996 A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
19006 An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
18999 y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
19001 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
19002 A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18998 Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
19007 A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
18993 If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
19003 Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18992 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18994 The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
18997 Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
19005 Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20761 If existence is absurd it can never have a meaning [Beauvoir]