10 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
20761 | If existence is absurd it can never have a meaning [Beauvoir] |