Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'fragments/reports' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


168 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates]
Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates]
The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle]
Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro]
The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro]
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro]
The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro]
The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro]
Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro]
The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro]
Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro]
The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro]
The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro]
Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro]
Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro]
Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro]
There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro]
Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro]
If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro]
Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro]
Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro]
Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro]
We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle]
Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates]
All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon]
The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates]
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates]
Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]