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All the ideas for 'talk', 'works' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates]
Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates]
The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle]
Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle]
Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates]
All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon]
The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates]
Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]