365 ideas
| 5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
| 13773 | For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates] |
| 7421 | A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault] |
| 5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 1649 | Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
| 21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
| 7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
| 21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
| 16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
| 5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
| 21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
| 21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
| 9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
| 5842 | Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 648 | Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
| 9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
| 5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
| 5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
| 5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
| 5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
| 5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
| 5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
| 5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
| 18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
| 5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
| 5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
| 5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
| 164 | It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates] |
| 5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
| 1647 | In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 115 | Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates] |
| 22099 | The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle] |
| 5844 | Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
| 11389 | Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
| 22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
| 5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
| 23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
| 5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
| 5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
| 639 | Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
| 18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
| 8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
| 16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
| 3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
| 12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
| 2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
| 19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
| 21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
| 5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
| 6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
| 1652 | Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
| 5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
| 22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
| 21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
| 6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
| 5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
| 5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
| 21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
| 7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
| 4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
| 5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
| 5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
| 6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
| 2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
| 5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
| 22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| 5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
| 5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
| 1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
| 5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
| 2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
| 5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
| 5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
| 9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
| 5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
| 5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
| 5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
| 5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
| 8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
| 23252 | Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M] |
| 21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
| 19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
| 5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
| 5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
| 5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
| 5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
| 22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
| 20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
| 20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
| 8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 5843 | People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5253 | Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates] |
| 1653 | Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 195 | No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates] |
| 199 | The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates] |
| 5839 | For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5867 | For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5069 | Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5836 | All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5840 | The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 185 | Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato] |
| 5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
| 5070 | Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates] |
| 5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 5838 | A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5837 | Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 3017 | The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1646 | Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos] |
| 1663 | By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
| 8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
| 126 | We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates] |
| 4111 | Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B] |
| 7808 | Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling] |
| 23907 | Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle] |
| 5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
| 5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
| 7585 | Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard] |
| 6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
| 5841 | Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
| 1661 | Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5846 | A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon] |
| 22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
| 8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
| 5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
| 5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
| 9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
| 5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
| 5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
| 5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
| 5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
| 5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
| 5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
| 5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 1657 | Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
| 1662 | A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
| 8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
| 3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
| 5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
| 5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
| 5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
| 5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
| 5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |