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All the ideas for 'talk', 'Just and Unjust Wars' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

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133 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
For the truth you need Prodicus's fifty-drachma course, not his one-drachma course [Socrates]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
A philosopher is one who cares about what other people care about [Socrates, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Socrates opened philosophy to all, but Plato confined moral enquiry to a tiny elite [Vlastos on Socrates]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Philosophical discussion involves dividing subject-matter into categories [Socrates, by Xenophon]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Socrates began the quest for something universal with his definitions, but he didn't make them separate [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is legitimate to play the devil's advocate [Socrates]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In Socratic dialogue you must say what you believe, so unasserted premises are not debated [Vlastos on Socrates]
Socrates was pleased if his mistakes were proved wrong [Socrates]
The method of Socrates shows the student is discovering the truth within himself [Socrates, by Carlisle]
Socrates always proceeded in argument by general agreement at each stage [Socrates, by Xenophon]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Socrates sought essences, which are the basis of formal logic [Socrates, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Socrates developed definitions as the basis of syllogisms, and also inductive arguments [Socrates, by Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro]
The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro]
The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro]
The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro]
Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro]
The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro]
Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro]
The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro]
The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro]
Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro]
Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro]
Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro]
There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro]
Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro]
If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro]
Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro]
Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro]
Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Socrates did not consider universals or definitions as having separate existence, but Plato made Forms of them [Socrates, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Socrates first proposed that we are run by mind or reason [Socrates, by Frede,M]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro]
We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice [Socrates, by Aristotle]
Socrates was the first to base ethics upon reason, and use reason to explain it [Taylor,R on Socrates]
All human virtues are increased by study and practice [Socrates, by Xenophon]
The wise perform good actions, and people fail to be good without wisdom [Socrates, by Xenophon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Socrates despised good looks [Socrates, by Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Socrates conservatively assumed that Athenian conventions were natural and true [Taylor,R on Socrates]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A well-made dung basket is fine, and a badly-made gold shield is base, because of function [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Things are both good and fine by the same standard [Socrates, by Xenophon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance [Socrates, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Socrates was the first to put 'eudaimonia' at the centre of ethics [Socrates, by Vlastos]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
By 'areté' Socrates means just what we mean by moral virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates]
Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We should ask what sort of people we want to be [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Socrates believed that basically there is only one virtue, the power of right judgement [Socrates, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Socrates made the civic values of justice and friendship paramount [Socrates, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage is scientific knowledge [Socrates, by Aristotle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Socrates emphasises that the knower is an existing individual, with existence his main task [Socrates, by Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Obedience to the law gives the best life, and success in war [Socrates, by Xenophon]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Socrates was the first to grasp that a cruelty is not justified by another cruelty [Vlastos on Socrates]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A lover using force is a villain, but a seducer is much worse, because he corrupts character [Socrates, by Xenophon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Socrates holds that right reason entails virtue, and this must also apply to the gods [Vlastos on Socrates]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
A new concept of God as unswerving goodness emerges from Socrates' commitment to virtue [Vlastos on Socrates]