16 ideas
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
1743 | The greatest deterrence for injustice is if uninjured parties feel as much indignation as those who are injured [Solon, by Diog. Laertius] |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |