Combining Texts

All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', 'Abstract Objects' and 'Causes and Conditions'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
6294 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
8821 Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
8915 How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
8917 The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
8912 Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
8913 Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
8914 Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
8916 Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8918 Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
8919 Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8337 Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8342 Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8343 Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
8385 A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
8335 Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
8336 The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8333 A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8395 Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
8334 The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]