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All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', 'Logical Necessity' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]