Combining Texts

All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement' and 'Properties'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]