116 ideas
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| 20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
| 20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
| 20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
| 18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
| 18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
| 18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
| 18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
| 18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
| 18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
| 18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
| 18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
| 18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
| 18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
| 18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
| 18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
| 18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
| 18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
| 18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
| 18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
| 18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
| 18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
| 18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
| 18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
| 18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
| 18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
| 18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
| 18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
| 18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
| 18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
| 18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
| 18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
| 18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
| 18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
| 18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
| 18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
| 18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
| 18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
| 18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
| 18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
| 18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
| 18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
| 20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
| 20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
| 20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
| 20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
| 20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
| 20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
| 20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
| 20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
| 20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
| 20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
| 20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
| 20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
| 20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
| 20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
| 22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
| 22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
| 22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
| 22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
| 18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |