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All the ideas for 'The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed)', 'Trees, Terms and Truth' and 'Universals'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S]
Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S]
'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S]
It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S]
We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S]
Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S]
The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S]
Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S]
It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S]
A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S]
Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S]