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All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'The Principles of Mathematics' and 'The Republic'

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183 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato]
The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato]
For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell]
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null class is a fiction [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell]
Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
Implication cannot be defined [Russell]
It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato]
In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell]
Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell]
Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell]
In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell]
Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett]
Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell]
Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell]
Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell]
Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell]
Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell]
For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell]
Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell]
There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell]
For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk]
Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell]
Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Numbers are properties of classes [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell]
In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak]
There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato]
The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell]
The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell]
A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato]
Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato]
Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato]
For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C]
Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato]
The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato]
Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato]
Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato]
Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato]
Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato]
Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato]
Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato]
Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato]
To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell]
Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato]