16 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |