16 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |