18 ideas
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |