14 ideas
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |