41 ideas
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |