13 ideas
| 22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
| 22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
| 13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
| 8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
| 13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
| 14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
| 23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
| 22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
| 22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
| 22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
| 22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |