41 ideas
| 7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
| 7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
| 7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
| 7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
| 7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
| 7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
| 22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| 7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
| 7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
| 7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
| 7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
| 7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
| 22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
| 7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
| 7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
| 7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
| 7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
| 7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
| 7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |