Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Modality' and 'On Eternal and Immutable Morality'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth]
The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth]