10 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
15923 | Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |