Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Gettier Problem', 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)' and 'The Symposium'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]