62 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
| 15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| 374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
| 389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
| 391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
| 392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
| 393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
| 385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
| 387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
| 373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
| 379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
| 371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
| 376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
| 382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
| 381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
| 386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
| 388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
| 377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
| 378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |