57 ideas
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |