88 ideas
| 24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
| 24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
| 24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| 24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
| 24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
| 21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
| 21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
| 21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
| 21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
| 24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
| 14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
| 14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
| 24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
| 14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
| 14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
| 14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
| 14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
| 14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
| 14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
| 14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
| 14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
| 14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
| 14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
| 14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
| 14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
| 14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
| 14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
| 14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
| 14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
| 14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
| 14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
| 14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
| 14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
| 14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
| 24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
| 24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
| 24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
| 24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
| 14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
| 14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
| 14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
| 5506 | If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus] |
| 21827 | The movement of Soul is continuous, but we are only aware of the parts of it that are sensed [Plotinus] |
| 24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
| 24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
| 21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
| 24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
| 24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
| 24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
| 21809 | Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus] |
| 21825 | The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus] |
| 24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
| 24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
| 21826 | The Soul reasons about the Right, so there must be some permanent Right about which it reasons [Plotinus] |
| 24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
| 24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
| 24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| 6922 | Ecstasy is for the neo-Platonist the highest psychological state of man [Plotinus, by Feuerbach] |
| 24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
| 24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
| 24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
| 24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
| 24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
| 24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
| 21816 | Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus] |
| 21815 | Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus] |
| 21814 | How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus] |
| 14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
| 24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
| 14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
| 14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
| 14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
| 14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
| 14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
| 14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
| 24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
| 21808 | Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus] |
| 21811 | Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus] |