Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Paradoxes of the Infinite' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]