Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Epistemology' and 'The Mind and the Soul'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]