25 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |