13 ideas
| 5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| 5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |