14 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |