12 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |