Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
22180 Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22172 Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
22177 Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22174 The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
22175 Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22182 Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
22185 Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22176 Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22178 If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
22173 Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]