Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Models' and 'The Question of Realism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
5831 The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
17499 Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
17498 In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
17501 Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
17502 The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
17496 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
17497 Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17500 General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
5826 The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]