Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds', 'Intellectual Autobiography' and 'Mathematics is Megethology'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]